Automating some tasks, cutting the posts that have become unnecessary, entrusting the rest to a slimmed-down team: on paper, the calculation is simple; before the court, it must be proven.
When a company turns to artificial intelligence (AI), the works council (comité social et économique, CSE) can intervene at two points. The first is now well known: the introduction of AI tools may constitute a new technology and, as such, be subject to prior consultation of the committee[1]. The company in question here had already experienced this, since the use of its tools had been suspended in summary proceedings (référé) for lack of consultation, a suspension that the Paris Court of Appeal upheld on 21 May 2026[2].
The second point has just been illustrated by the Créteil Judicial Court (tribunal judiciaire). Once the tool had been introduced and the committee consulted, the employer presented a reorganisation plan, followed by a collective redundancy plan; by a summary order of 15 September 2026[3], the judge suspended both, even though the consultation of the CSE on the reorganisation had been completed.
The judge set aside the grounds for the redundancies and focused instead on the consequences of the reorganisation for the workload and health of the remaining employees.
For employers, the lesson is twofold: consult the CSE before deploying the tool; then, before cutting jobs, measure what the reorganisation changes for those who remain.
I. A reorganisation based on automating 70% of tasks
A publisher of trade magazines, the company employs in its editorial teams both writers, who write the articles, and sub-editors, who proofread and correct them, write the headlines and standfirsts, check the facts and prepare the layout with the layout artists and picture editors.
The company was already using a generative AI tool that assisted with transcribing interviews and with writing and correcting articles. It intended to add new features: spelling, grammar and typographical correction; checking editorial consistency; verifying the reliability of information. These features covered a large part of the sub-editors’ work.
The employer concluded that around 70% of the sub-editors’ working time corresponded to tasks that the tool could now take over; the remaining 30%, which require human input (coordination, supervision, editorial decisions), would be entrusted to two chief sub-editors. The plan therefore eliminated the eight sub-editor posts and created two.
For the writers, the employer announced a minor change: they would use the tool to submit clean copy and propose their own headlines, with no significant effect on their workload.
The CSE disputed this calculation: in its view, far from disappearing, the sub-editors’ work would shift onto those who remained, notably the writers, tasked with reviewing and validating the tool’s suggestions, and the two chief sub-editors.
Consulted on the plan, the CSE appointed an expert and delivered its opinion on 15 July 2026, before applying to the summary judge (juge des référés), who can swiftly order interim measures. The employer argued that, the consultation being closed, it could no longer be challenged. The judge rejected the argument: having been brought after the consultation closed, the application did not fall within litigation concerning the information of the CSE[4]; it was therefore admissible. The committee was in any case relying on a ground other than the consultation, namely the employer’s safety obligation.
II. An insufficient assessment of the risks to employees’ health
The employer must take the measures necessary to ensure the safety and protect the physical and mental health of workers; the summary judge may bring to an end any manifestly unlawful disturbance, that is to say any obvious breach of a rule of law[5]. To obtain the suspension, the CSE therefore had to establish that two conditions were met: the existence of an objectively established risk liable to cause serious harm to the health and safety of employees; and the absence of adequate preventive measures.
As to the risk, the 70% figure did not convince the judge. Drawn up by management and the project team on the basis of trials conducted with an external consultant, the figure had been set without the involvement of the employees concerned and without any testing under the real conditions of producing a magazine; nor did the employer show that it had produced the complete test issue it had announced.
To demonstrate the absence of overload, the employer had a judicial officer (commissaire de justice) record a trial of the tool on three articles. The judge noted that this trial had been carried out without the CSE, by the project manager, whose status as a writer had not been established; the record also showed that the tool lengthened the texts, which the writer then had to shorten.
There remained the number of posts created. According to the expert, the employer itself estimated the remaining work at between 2 and 2.4 full-time posts, yet created only two; moreover, the writers, typographers and layout artists, whose workload might also increase, had been left out of the calculation.
The judge concluded that implementing the plan “on this approximate basis, unsupported by any real-life trial” appeared to represent “a serious and established risk to the physical and mental health of several categories of employees”.
As to prevention, the single risk assessment document (document unique d’évaluation des risques), which every employer must keep, mentioned three AI-related risks, including stress arising from job insecurity, without assessing either their severity or their frequency. As for the planned support measures, such as training on the tool, the employer did not show that they had been implemented.
III. A provisional suspension that does not prohibit the reorganisation
The judge suspended both plans, including redeployment, subject to a penalty payment (astreinte) of 8,000 euros per day for three months. The suspension applies until real-life tests, including test issues, have confirmed the share of the sub-editors’ work actually taken over by the tool and, where appropriate, the effect of the plan on the workload of writers, typographers and layout artists has been reassessed. The prohibition of the plans sought by the CSE, however, was not ordered.
The scope of this order must, however, be kept in perspective.
Because the summary judge orders only interim measures, the decision does not have res judicata effect as to the merits[6]. The order bears the mark of this down to its very wording: the plan “appears” to represent a serious risk; the CSE “sufficiently” establishes the manifestly unlawful disturbance.
Nothing has therefore been decided on the merits: neither the justification for the job cuts, nor the grounds for the redundancies, nor, definitively, the breach of the safety obligation; the trial judge, if seised, would not be bound by this assessment.
Delivered at first instance, the order may be appealed; it is nonetheless enforceable as of right, so that the suspension applies immediately. It does, however, leave room for the plan to resume, subject to checks that the employer can carry out itself.
The order thus implicitly outlines a method for employers: test the tool under real conditions before quantifying its gains; involve the employees who perform the automated tasks in the assessment, keeping a record of attempts made to that end; assess the workload of all affected posts, not only those being eliminated; size the new posts consistently with the employer’s own figures; and, finally, rate the AI-related risks in the single risk assessment document.
In this case, consulting the CSE before introducing AI was not enough. While the order prohibits neither the use of the tool nor the reorganisation, it makes job cuts enabled by AI subject to a requirement that no calculation can dispense with: measuring, under real conditions, their effects on those who remain.
[1] Labour Code, art. L. 2312-8, II, 4°.
[2] CA Paris, pôle 1 ch. 2, 21 May 2026, No. 25/13234, upholding TJ Créteil, summary order, 15 July 2025, No. 25/00850.
[3] TJ Créteil, summary order, 15 September 2026, RG No. 26/00991.
[4] Labour Code, art. L. 2312-15.
[5] Labour Code, arts. L. 4121-1 and L. 4121-2; Code of Civil Procedure, art. 835.
[6] Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 484 and 488.
