Since the financial collapse of 2019, Lebanon has faced a question that few states have had to settle so starkly: which of the state, the banks or the savers will bear losses that no one any longer disputes? Pending an answer, the banks have frozen deposits; thousands of depositors, many of whom live in France, can no longer access funds that their bank statements nevertheless continue to show.
Yet the crisis and its remedy do not sit on the same level. The crisis is collective, sovereign and geopolitical: how to allocate a hole of some 72 billion dollars between the state, the banks and the savers, which a bill still under debate in the Lebanese Parliament is setting out to do.
The depositor’s right, by contrast, is individual and contractual: a deposit is not a share in the losses of the banking system, but a sum that the bank has undertaken to return on first demand. From this distinction arises a concrete opportunity: a depositor domiciled in France can step outside the settlement being negotiated in Beirut by enforcing, before the French courts, a straightforward right to restitution.
Two questions therefore frame the analysis: the legal basis of the claim, which Lebanese law establishes unambiguously (I); and its enforcement, which requires setting aside the clause conferring jurisdiction on the Beirut courts in order to bring proceedings before the French courts and recover the funds (II).
I. The obligation of restitution under Lebanese law
On this point, Lebanese law is clear. The Code of Obligations and Contracts[1] enshrines freedom of contract and defines a deposit as the contract by which the depositary “receives a movable item from the depositor with the obligation to keep it and to return it”, the depositary being required to return the item “as soon as the depositor so requests”. Article 307 of the Commercial Code, to which Article 123 of the Code of Money and Credit refers, applies this rule to deposits of funds: a bank that receives a sum acquires ownership of it but must return it “on the depositor’s first request”.
On that premise, no rule justifies the refusals made since 2019. The circulars of the Banque du Liban, which the banks cite at the foot of their statements to refuse transfers and withdrawals, are merely regulatory acts of the monetary authority, which can neither repeal nor suspend a statutory and contractual obligation of restitution[2]. And since no law has introduced capital controls, the freeze still has no legal basis.
The defences raised by the banks do not withstand scrutiny. Force majeure, first, requires an unforeseeable event, which the crisis, long foretold, was not; and in any event the depositor’s claim seeks performance of an obligation, not the establishment of liability.
Next, payment by cheque does not discharge the debt, since a cheque drawn on the Banque du Liban cannot be cashed under current conditions. Lastly, consignment is merely an offer of performance, which the creditor may refuse, and does not amount to payment[3].
In addition to these arguments, depositors who are natural persons benefit from Lebanese consumer protection, which requires the contract to be interpreted in their favour and deprives of effect any amendments by which they supposedly “accepted” the restrictions[4].
Focus: the “gap law” in abeyance
This lack of a legal basis is not set to disappear in the short term. At the instigation of the International Monetary Fund, two pieces of legislation have been initiated.
The first, the law on the resolution and restructuring of the banking sector, was passed by Parliament on 31 July 2025, but the Constitutional Council struck down several of its provisions on 3 October 2025.
The second, the bill on the “financial gap”, is intended to establish and then allocate between the state, the banks and depositors a deficit estimated at around 72 billion dollars; approved by the Council of Ministers and sent to Parliament, it has not yet been voted on.
In broad terms, the bill provides for full repayment of deposits below 100,000 dollars and, above that amount, repayment of a first tranche followed by conversion of the balance into tradable securities, with a substantial discount in present value for the largest amounts.
“For as long as the financial gap law has not been passed, the freezing of deposits rests on no rule having the force of statute, and the contractual obligation of restitution retains its full force.”
Two consequences follow.
First, until this bill is passed, the freeze has no statutory basis.
Second, if it were passed in its current form, it would impose on large depositors a loss that their contract does not permit. Depositors domiciled in France therefore have an interest in bringing proceedings on the basis of their right to full restitution without waiting for the outcome of the parliamentary debate.
II. The jurisdiction of the French courts and the means of recovery
The jurisdiction of the French courts rests on the Brussels I bis Regulation of 12 December 2012, Articles 17 to 19 of which establish consumer protection in cross-border disputes[5]. This protection is subject to three cumulative conditions: consumer status, domicile in France and banking activity directed towards France.
The first, consumer status, is an autonomous concept of EU law: it covers any natural person who enters into a contract for a purpose outside his or her trade or profession, so that a savings account or a personal foreign currency account qualifies, even if the account holder also practises a profession[6].
The second, domicile in France, is assessed under the law of the court seised, on the basis of a body of evidence (tax assessments, property ownership, bank accounts, family ties) assessed as at the date of the writ of summons and not the date of the contract. A foreign address given when the account was opened, or a residence declared for tax purposes, is not enough to rule it out; it is nonetheless for the depositor to establish the reality of his or her ties to France, which is not always straightforward[7].
The third, activity directed towards France, is the most debated: it is inferred from a body of evidence (foreign currency accounts, international transfers, international IBAN and BIC codes, online banking, a multilingual website, a diaspora customer base), without a French branch being required, and is assessed case by case, as at the date of the contract[8].
Where these conditions are met, the clause conferring jurisdiction on the Beirut courts is set aside: Article 19 prohibits any derogation before the dispute has arisen, and Article 18 allows consumers to bring proceedings in the courts of their domicile[9].
A difficulty remained for banks established outside the European Union, to which Article 18 does not apply directly. Article 6(1) then refers to the law of the forum, that is, French private international law, which likewise holds that a foreign jurisdiction clause cannot be relied on against a consumer domiciled in France, as the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) has confirmed in its most recent case law[10]:
“Where a contract is concluded with a consumer, the consumer cannot be deprived, by a jurisdiction clause designating a foreign court, of the right to bring proceedings before the French courts [if domiciled in France on the day the claim is filed]”
Jurisdiction is, however, only of value if the judgment can be enforced. Enforcing a French judgment in Lebanon through exequatur proceedings is lengthy and uncertain; it is preferable to target the assets held by the banks in France.
To that end, a formal notice first establishes that the sum is due and sets the date from which interest runs. A protective attachment (saisie conservatoire) then makes it possible to freeze the relevant assets in advance (shares in a French subsidiary, receivables from correspondent banks), provided that the claim appears well founded in principle and that its recovery is under threat.
Proceedings on the merits, brought before the court of the depositor’s domicile, then seek repayment of the balance in its original currency; and, once an enforceable judgment has been obtained, an attachment of debts (saisie-attribution) followed, where appropriate, by a seizure of real property convert the protective measures into actual recovery.
The route is therefore open in principle, since the obligation of restitution derives from Lebanese law, the jurisdiction of the French courts from consumer protection, and enforcement from ordinary civil procedures.
Everything then turns on how the case file is put together. Proof of residence in France at the date of the writ of summons, consumer status, the bank’s directed activity, and forward planning of enforcement measures.
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This article is published for general information purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice and cannot replace advice tailored to your situation. Bruzzo Dubucq is available to the depositors concerned to review their situation.
[1] Lebanese Code of Obligations and Contracts, Arts. 166, 302, 690 and 701
[2] Banque du Liban, intermediate circular no. 151, April 2020, withdrawals in Lebanese pounds at an administered rate
Banque du Liban, intermediate circular no. 158, 8 June 2021, monthly withdrawals in “fresh dollars”
Banque du Liban, intermediate circular no. 166, 3 February 2024, monthly withdrawals from “lollar” accounts
Banque du Liban, related circular no. 155
Banque du Liban, related circular no. 161
[3]Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, Arts. 822 et seq. Lebanese case law holds that consignment, like the handing over of a cheque that cannot be cashed, does not amount to performance of the obligation of restitution
[4]Lebanese Law no. 659/2005 of 4 February 2005 on consumer protection, Art. 18
[5] Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012, Arts. 17 to 19
[6] CJEU, 3 Oct. 2019, Petruchová, C-208/18; CJEU, 14 Feb. 2019, Milivojević, C-630/17
[7] Brussels I bis Regulation, Art. 62; 25 Oct. 2011, Hypoteční banka, C-327/10
[8] CJEU, 7 Dec. 2010, Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, C-585/08 and C-144/09
As applied to Lebanese banks: Cass. 1re civ., 18 Sept. 2024, no. 23-13.732; Cass. 1re civ., 7 June 2023, no. 22-16.758; for a more nuanced view, CA Versailles, 19 Sept. 2024, no. 24/02813
[9] Brussels I bis Regulation, Arts. 18 and 19
[10] Brussels I bis Regulation, Art. 6(1). To the same effect: Cass. 1re civ., 25 Mar. 2026, no. 24-21.422 and no. 24-21.790; see also CA Paris, 25 Sept. 2024, no. 23/14830 and no. 23/14955; TJ Paris, 15 Jan. 2025, no. 23/11305
