Cass. Crim, 14 October 2025, No. 24-86.603
Public defamation, an emblematic criminal offence in press law, raises important questions as to determining the person targeted by the impugned statements, an essential condition for establishing this offence.
Defined by Article 29 of the Act of 29 July 1881 on the freedom of the press, the punishment of defamation seeks to protect people’s honour and reputation. Accordingly, only the allegation or imputation of a specific fact, capable of being readily proved and debated in adversarial proceedings, and which harms the honour or reputation of the person to whom the fact is imputed, is defamatory.
Among the constituent elements referred to above, the requirement that the person targeted be identifiable plays a decisive role, since defamation can only be considered if the disputed statements make it possible to link the imputed fact, directly or indirectly, to an identifiable person.
In this case, the mayor of a municipality had published a message on a social network criticising a political opponent, described as “the former parliamentary assistant of the former MP and mayor”, who had allegedly insulted and provoked municipal staff. The former parliamentary assistant recognised herself in this description and filed a complaint for public defamation of a private individual.
Although convicted at first instance, the mayor was acquitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment of 16 October 2024, on the ground that the impugned statements referred to “the former parliamentary assistant of the former MP and mayor”, never mentioned her name and contained no information enabling her to be identified. The judges further noted that the complainant had not shown that she had been the sole assistant of the former MP and mayor, nor that she was known as such, which made her identification too uncertain.
The question therefore arose whether public defamation can be established where the disputed statements do not name the person targeted and, above all, do not make it possible to identify her with certainty.
The French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) answers in the affirmative in a judgment of 14 October 2025. It holds that “where the imputations have been made in an allusive or veiled form so as to cast suspicion on several persons, each of them has standing to bring a defamation action”.
In this decision, the Criminal Division recognises the possibility of multiple identification (I) while establishing a more subjective approach to the criterion, based on the legitimate perception of the person targeted (II).
I. Multiple standing to sue where an imputation may target several persons
In order to bring an action under criminal press law, a victim who is not expressly named must show that she is identified through the impugned statements.
Article 29 of the Act of 29 July 1881 addresses this question by stating that there is defamation even if the imputation “targets a person or body not expressly named, but whose identification is made possible by the terms” of the impugned text.
While judges may rely on “extrinsic and clear circumstances confirming that designation so as to make it obvious”, the offence must still target an identifiable person.
The principle of indirect or allusive identification was therefore well established.
However, the decision of 14 October 2025, while remaining squarely within the existing statutory and case-law framework, extends its scope by holding that, where a defamatory statement casts suspicion on several persons, each of them has standing to sue. Put differently, even if the impugned statement does not make it possible to determine precisely which of the parliamentary assistants was targeted, the plurality of persons potentially concerned does not exclude their right to bring an action.
By overturning the Court of Appeal, which had, on the contrary, required proof of certain identification (on the ground that the complainant’s name was not mentioned and that she had not shown that she was the sole assistant of the MP concerned), the French Supreme Court opens the way to a broad interpretation of the constituent elements of defamation.
Such a judge-made interpretation is unusual in this field, press law being guided by a heightened concern to protect freedom of expression and therefore by a restrictive interpretation of the conditions for bringing a matter before the criminal courts. Claimants relying on this solution will undoubtedly be numerous, and judgments clarifying its contours can be expected.
Some will consider that this clarification is nonetheless of particular importance in the age of social media, where a message referring to a status, role or position may suffice to identify the person targeted, without it being necessary to name her explicitly.
More surprising still, in order to accept that multiple identification does not preclude the admissibility of the action, the Criminal Division chose to rely on a subjective assessment of the condition relating to the imputation of the defamatory fact.
II. Towards a subjective approach to identifying the person defamed
The decision of 14 October 2025 establishes a “subjective” approach to the identification criterion: standing to bring a defamation action no longer depends solely on the public’s ability to recognise the victim, but also on the victim’s legitimate perception of being targeted.
The Criminal Division here considers that the complainant was entitled to consider herself targeted since she was one of the successive parliamentary assistants of the former MP and mayor concerned.
Identification is therefore no longer an exclusively “objective” matter or one “external” to the civil party’s own perception: what now matters is that the person legitimately recognises herself in the disputed statement, reflecting a desire to protect individuals’ reputations against increasingly diffuse attacks.
This subjectivisation is thus part of a movement to rebalance press law in the digital age. It appears to illustrate the Court’s wish to preserve the coherence of the punitive framework established by the 1881 Act, while adapting its interpretation to the contemporary realities of communication.
The approach adopted nonetheless calls for certain clarifications to gauge its scope.
First, while the Court accepts that a statement may target several persons, it does not thereby relieve the prosecuting party of the need to demonstrate the existence of actual harm to her honour or reputation.
Second, it is settled case law that the action is reserved to direct victims, that is to say that not only must the impugned statements target an identifiable person, but it is also only that person directly targeted, and she alone, who may bring proceedings. Likewise, it is established that “defamation targeting one person can only extend to another insofar as the defamatory imputations are extended to that other person”. For example, a legal entity cannot be equated with the individuals who compose it, since defamation of a company does not extend to its directors, and vice versa.
***
Summary: The French Supreme Court clarifies the scope of Article 29 of the Act of 29 July 1881 by holding that an imputation, even if made in an allusive or veiled manner, may target several persons without preventing each of them from bringing a defamation action. By recognising that each is entitled to consider herself targeted, it gives the identification criterion a subjective dimension, suited to changing modes of communication.
